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ABSTRACT

INTRODUCTION

The emergence of online labor markets makes it far easier
to use individual human raters to evaluate materials for data
collection and analysis in the social sciences. In this paper,
we report the results of an experiment — conducted in an online labor market — that measured the effectiveness of a collection of social and ﬁnancial incentive schemes for motivating workers to conduct a qualitative, content analysis task.
Overall, workers performed better than chance, but results
varied considerably depending on task difﬁculty. We ﬁnd
that treatment conditions which asked workers to prospectively think about the responses of their peers — when combined with ﬁnancial incentives — produced more accurate
performance. Other treatments generally had weak effects
on quality. Workers in India performed signiﬁcantly worse
than US workers, regardless of treatment group.

The binding constraint in much observational, empirical research in the social sciences is ﬁnding data with useful, wellmeasured indepedent and dependent variables. Often, compelling research questions require the quantiﬁcation of complex constructs such as trustworthiness, beauty, or aggression. Since these kinds of measures are unlikely to appear
in observational data sets, researchers must look at primary
source material and then classify it according to some coding scheme. A recent economic study asked subjects to assess the trustworthiness of loan-seekers based on their photographs on the social lending site Prosper.com and then
used these ratings to predict loan outcomes[10]. Another
example used amateur evaluations of short debate clips from
gubernatorial elections and found that these evaluations were
predictive[3]. Often times these qualitative coding tasks require human judgment, but not any expertise. While this
makes them ideal for inexpert raters, the tasks themselves
are often tedious and time-consuming, and ﬁnding research
assistance to perform them may be difﬁcult or expensive.
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BRIEF SUMMARY

We compare incentive schemes in an online labor market
experiment and ﬁnd that asking subjects to consider the answers of their peers produces more accurate performance on
a content analysis task. Workers in India and workers with
lower web-browsing skills also performed worse than their
peers on the task.
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An emerging phenomenon — the online labor market —
can scale the process of qualitative coding (also known in
some social science circles as “content analysis”) using large
numbers of non-experts. Previous research has discussed
the potential advantages of online labor markets in terms
of the cost, scale, and validity of experimental data collection.[16] However, these studies have not addressed the opportunities and constraints of applying distributed labor to
content analysis tasks. In particular, while the number of
workers participating in online labor markets makes it relatively easy to attract many judgments for any task, it is difﬁcult to elicit and synthesize high-quality judgments from
non-expert raters collaborating remotely. Among the foremost practical challenges of this kind, the design of optimal
incentives schemes to facilitate this peculiar form of cooperative work has received scant scholarly attention. Prior economic, sociological and psychological research offers much
theoretical guidance, but little empirical evidence as to the
sorts of incentives that elicit the highest quality judgments
from non-expert raters.
In this paper, we present the results of a controlled experiment that directly compares the effects of fourteen different incentive schemes within the context of an online labor
market. The incentive schemes encompass a wide variety
of existing research into human cooperation, labor, motivation and behavior. We test the incentives using a single,

non-expert content analysis task, for which we obtained validated answers prior to administering the experiment. We
then compare the aggregate performance of workers in the
different treatment conditions in order to determine which
incentive schemes elicit the most accurate judgments in comparison to the control condition.
Use of Online Labor Markets

In online labor markets, workers from around the world perform data processing tasks for money. While some sites focus on skilled work like computer programming (e.g., oDesk,
Elance, Guru), Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) is intended for small, simple and discrete tasks and thus is probably the most directly useful for researchers. The challenge
of tapping this resource is that raters are inexpert and there
is sometimes a high degree of inter-rater disagreement, regardless of the measure. The low cost of raters make large
numbers of ratings possible, but this volume of data also
prohibits a hand-curated approach to selecting high-quality
raters.1
Several papers in the computer science literature have used
online labor markets such as MTurk to conduct experiments
[21, 29, 28]. Horton, Rand and Zeckhauser discuss the social science potential of online experiments in these markets, focusing on how challenges to validity can be overcome
[16]. There already exists a small literature on crowdsourcing from a social science perspective [18, 24, 15, 7, 6]. New
tools are also being developed that make experimentation
easier [23].

In some kinds of research, human judgments can be evaluated against objective, correct answers. This is the case for
tasks such as image labeling or character recognition, where
accurate automated techniques remain costly or unavailable.
In others, human judgments are important precisely because
they incorporate subjective perceptions, which may be central to the topic of study. This is the case for many types
of content analysis tasks, where researchers aim to identify
certain qualities or patterns in textual materials that evade
automated detection. In both objective and subjective variants, the challenge of developing techniques to aggregate individual judgments as well as to assess their precision and
accuracy has given rise to several different methodological
techniques, some of which we review as background to the
method we used in this study.
Useful methodological approaches to this type of problem
have emerged among scholars conducting content analysis
of textual materials. Until recently, content analysis techniques have relied on multiple researchers implementing a
qualitative labeling or coding scheme of the same text(s),
and then using speciﬁcally adapted correlation statistics to
evaluate inter-rater (or intercoder) reliability [22, 8]. The
primary advantage of these approaches lies in the ability to
measure empirically the reliability of seemingly subjective
observations. The cost of such precision, however, is often quite high in terms of time and labor, making such analysis prohibitively expensive when the scale of data collection and analysis grows large. Recent work by Hopkins and
King has demonstrated that machine-learning tools and techniques can overcome these limitations while retaining high
conﬁdence in the precision and accuracy of results [14].

Obtaining Quality Work

In online labor markets, the usual rules of labor supply generally apply: more money attracts more workers on both the
extensive margin (i.e., more workers are willing to participate at all) and the intensive margin (i.e., workers that participate work longer or produce more). However, attracting more workers does not necessarily lead to better work.
While earlier work [30, 19, 29, 14, 9] has focused on techniques for ﬁltering and processing judgments of inexpert human raters, we focus on how to produce better judgments in
the ﬁrst place.
Some work has already been done in this vein. A recent experimental paper by Chandler and Kapelner [5], conducted
in MTurk, looked at how knowledge about the purpose of
a task affected quality and labor supply. US-based subjects
who knew they were labeling cancer cells in an image produced more output than those who did not. Interestingly,
they found no evidence of similar effects for non-US workers. The same authors also recently conducted an experiment
in which they demonstrated that slowing down the presentation of survey questions increased comprehension [20].
Content Analysis
1
Several innovative start-up companies, such as Crowdﬂower are
offering services as intermediaries. Clients bring them tasks
amenable to the crowdsourcing approach and they break the tasks
down, recruit workers and ensure quality results.

Our Approach

A variety of papers across the social sciences have studied
human motivation. This literature is far too voluminous to
summarize here; much of it is also captured by folk wisdom
or even in management cliches. What is certainly not known
is the relative merits of different motivations and how they
apply in online contexts. For example, does offering workers
more money improve effort and hence quality? This lack of
knowledge motivated this study, in which we created a large
number of treatment groups and recruited a vast number of
subjects. While this “kitchen sink” approach creates some
problems of analysis, it does afford our observations greater
breadth of comparison. We review the different motivational
frameworks in greater depth below.
Our Task

For our task, we asked subjects recruited from Mechanical
Turk (“Turkers”) to complete a set of six closed-ended, qualitative content analysis questions using an online survey interface. All subjects in all treatment groups (except one of
the two control groups, which only answered demographic
questions) were directed to analyze the Kiva.org website and
then presented with the same six questions in the same order and with the same answer choices through the survey
interface. The questions asked subjects to conduct content
analysis similar to that used in an earlier study by [4] to assess US political blogs. For any questions, workers could

choose to leave a blank response.
Overview of Results

Our results varied by question as well as by treatment condition. On the two easiest questions, the Turkers uniformly
performed much better than random guessing and only a
couple of the treatments seemed to produce any (small) effect at all. By contrast, the results for the three difﬁcult
questions varied more widely. In one case, the Turkers’
performance was much worse than chance. At the same
time, the variance in responses to these questions also revealed stronger treatment effects. Aggregating the results
from each condition across all ﬁve questions, the Turkers
performed better than chance. More importantly, a few treatments proved to be markedly more effective than the others,
producing signiﬁcant improvements in average answer quality when compared against the control condition. We discuss the experimental design, data collection and results in
greater depth below.
METHODS AND MATERIALS
Content Analysis Task

In order to establish a reliable standard against which to
judge the performance of the workers, we also administered
the same questions about the same website through an identical web interface to a group of ﬁve research assistants prior
to conducting the experiment. On all of the questions included in the study, at least four of the ﬁve research assistants
gave identical responses, suggesting a high degree of intercoder reliability. Independent of the research assistants, one
of the authors also collected his own answers to the questions, agreeing with the prevailing answer provided by the
research assistants in every case. We used these responses
as validated (i.e., gold standard) answers to each question.
The ﬁrst two questions followed a multiple choice format, in
which subjects were asked to identify whether (1) a privacy
policy; and (2) “avatars” or other visual representations of
user identities were present on the site. For both of these
questions an “uncertain” answer choice was also available.
The third and fourth questions asked subjects to assess how
frequently members of the site engaged in speciﬁc behaviors
(ranking or rating (3) content and (4) other users) using a ﬁve
point scale ranging from “Very frequently” to “Very rarely
or never.” Finally, the last two questions asked subjects to
identify whether speciﬁc features related to (5) social networking and (6) revenue creation were present or not on the
site. In these last two, subjects could check boxes to select
any combination of answer choices from a pre-deﬁned list.
The ﬁrst of the six questions (about whether or not the site
had a privacy policy) was presented prior to treatment. We
report the results for this pre-treatment question but do not
include it as part of our outcome performance measurement.
A copy of the questions as they appeared in the experimental
interface is available on Horton’s website.2
The dependent variable of our study was the number of correct answers to the ﬁve post-treatment information-seeking
2
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questions per subject.3 We considered blank responses incorrect answers for all questions. After coding responses to
identify which ones each subject answered correctly (i.e., in
agreement with the gold standard response), we aggregated
the number of correct answers per subject. The outcome
measure is therefore an integer (count) with a value between
zero and ﬁve. As we describe in further detail below, the subjects recruited through MTurk performed better than chance
- estimated as random guessing between all available answer
choices for every question - on four of the ﬁve post-treatment
questions.
The demographic questions asked subjects to provide their
age; gender; country of residence; education level; language
skills; employment status; household size; and internet skills.
We included them to increase precision in our treatment estimates as well as to verify that our randomization was valid
(we discuss the rationale for this choice in further detail below).
Conduct of the experiment

Recruitment was conducted through the MTurk online labor market, where we advertised a brief information-seeking
task. Recruitment materials included a description of the
study as well as a set of example questions, all of which were
included in the actual job, but none of which were among
the post-treatment questions included in our outcome variables of interest. Subjects were not informed that they were
participating in a study at the time of recruitment so as to
preserve the “natural” environment of the ﬁeld experiment
in the online labor market. In the task description, we explained that workers would be paid $0.30 for completing
the task. Given the length of the assignment and the fact
that workers could only complete our job once (many jobs
on MTurk allow workers to return multiple times), this payment rate was comparable with many other jobs posted to
the MTurk marketplace.
Upon agreeing to accept the task on the MTurk website,
subjects were instructed to click a hyperlink pointing to a
private server at an anonymized URL. While we were not
able to collect data on how many individuals saw our recruitment materials, once a worker accepted our task, their
unique MTurk user ID was assigned randomly to one of
the treatment or control conditions and (together with their
IP address and the information about treatment assignment)
stored by a database on our server. As a result, we were able
to use these different pieces of stored identifying information
to block individual subjects from completing the study more
than once or from being exposed to more than one of the
experimental manipulations. While there is some possibility that individuals could possess more than one account on
the MTurk platform and thereby might have circumvented
these protections, such behavior is expressly prohibited by
3
In the case of the checkbox questions – numbers (5) and (6) – we
coded any response including the gold standard answer as correct.
Obviously, in the case of a question where we did not know the
correct answer ahead of time, a much different process would be
needed to identify the best response. As such ﬁltering processes
were not the focus of this study, we refer consideration of this topic
to the work of others.[29]

the site’s terms of service and Amazon actively polices violations (indeed, one of the authors of the study had the somewhat embarassing experience of losing his MTurk account as
a result of attempting to create multiple user names in order
to test a pilot version of an earlier study). Furthermore, the
payoff for circumventing the system protections on our job
(which required a little more than 2000 unique judgments)
were very low in comparison with some of the large scale
jobs on the site which frequently elicit hundreds of thousands or even millions of individual judgments. As a result,
we feel conﬁdent in the integrity of both the randomization
as well as the different treatment conditions.
Once Turkers clicked through to our server, the experimental instrument was administered through a web-based survey
interface. Subjects were presented with a single page containing the version of the instrument corresponding to their
treatment assignment. Each version of the instrument began with some general instructions about the task, and (in all
conditions except for the demographic control) a link to the
URL of the site that would serve as the topic of the questions
(Kiva.org). These were followed by several pre-treatment
questions about the site. Then, we introduced the experimental manipulations (usually consisting of a block of text)
followed by the post-treatment questions and any treatmentspeciﬁc materials. Finally, the instruments concluded with a
series of demographic questions.
Overview of Treatments: Social, Financial, and Hybrid
Incentives

The experimental manipulations we introduced consisted of
framing the information-seeking questions in distinct ways
using a series of “social” and “ﬁnancial” incentives. Together, these different incentive schemes encompass a number of salient theories of human motivation drawn from several social sciences. Generally, the social incentives emphasized non-monetary rewards or punishments for performing
our task whereas the ﬁnancial incentives offered monetary
rewards (bonus payments) for good performance or punishments (lost bonus payments). Some frameworks were hybrids that combined social and ﬁnancial incentives. In total,
we tested fourteen different incentive frameworks and compared subject performance in each condition against a control condition that involved no framing incentives beyond
the baseline compensation offered for completing the job.
We also included a second control group in which subjects
responded only to the pre-treatment and demographic questions used in the other conditions. All subjects who completed the task were given the baseline compensation. Because of some technical complications, we ended up paying
all subjects the largest amount they could have received from
their experimental treatment in order to avoid under-paying
any deserving subjects.
All control and treatment conditions are described in further
detail below. For each of the treatment conditions (listed
in bold) we have noted in parentheses whether it is social,
ﬁnancial or hybrid in nature and included the full treatment
text. Where appropriate, we have also included references to
relevant studies in which comparable incentives were found

to effect behavioral outcomes.
Control Conditions

Control Workers were presented with all pre-treatment, posttreatment and demographic questions.
Demographic Workers were presented with pre-treatment
and demographic questions only.4
Treatment Conditions

Tournament scoring (social) “For some of the following
ﬁve questions, you will be in competition against another
worker. After this HIT is completed, we will compare
your accuracy on these questions against the accuracy of
another worker who we will select at random. We will report the results of the competition to you when we process
your payment.”
Cheap Talk — Surveillance (social) “After this HIT has
been completed, your answers to these questions will be
reviewed for accuracy.”
Cheap Talk — Normative (social) “It is your job to provide accurate answers to these question. It is important
that you do your job well.”
Solidarity (hybrid) “For some of the following ﬁve questions, you have been assigned to the Red team. You and
your teammates have the opportunity to earn bonuses based
on your collective performance. After the HIT has been
completed, we will verify the answers that you all submitted for these questions (independent of the website you are
analyzing) and compare your team’s performance with another group of workers completing this HIT. If your team
wins, you will all receive a bonus.”
Humanization (social) “Before you complete the questions,
I just wanted to thank you again for doing this work. My
name is Aaron.”5
Trust (social) “Thank you for completing the ﬁrst set of
questions. Here is your conﬁrmation code, which you
may paste into the ﬁeld on the original HIT page at any
time to receive payment. We trust that you will still complete the questions below to the best of your ability. Your
conﬁrmation code and payment for this HIT will not
change based on the answers you submit.”6
Normative priming questions (social) “Before answering
the next set of questions about the website, we want to
4
Whenever possible, the demographic questions were taken verbatim from the 2005 codebook of the World Values Survey [1]. As we
described later in the paper, we also borrowed two questions about
Internet-use skills from Eszter Hargittai [13].
5
This treatment text was accompanied by a photo of one of the
authors.
6
In order to make this treatment condition consistent with the design of all other conditions, all workers were asked to submit a
completion code when they ﬁnished the job. In every condition except this one, we provided these completion codes once the task
had been ﬁnished and the answers to all questions submitted to our
server. Compensation was not conditional on submitting the completion code in any of the conditions.

ask you a few questions about yourself and your attitudes
about work.”7
Reward Accuracy (ﬁnancial) “After this HIT has been completed, we will verify the correct answers for at least one
of the following ﬁve questions. For each ‘trap door’ question we will increase your total pay by 10% if you answered it correctly. You will not receive this bonus if you
do not answer the ‘trap door’ question(s) correctly.”
Reward Agreement (ﬁnancial) “After this HIT has been
completed, we will review the answers for at least one of
the following ﬁve questions. For each of the questions we
review, we will reward you for agreeing with the answers
provided by the majority of other workers who complete
this HIT. The reward will be a bonus of 10% for every
agreement.”
Punishment Accuracy (ﬁnancial) “After this HIT has been
completed, we will verify the correct answers for at least
one of the following ﬁve questions. For each one of these
‘trap door’ questions we will penalize you 10% of the
bonus that you would have received if you answered it
incorrectly.”
Punishment Agreement (ﬁnancial) “After this HIT has
been completed, we will review the answers for at least
one of the following ﬁve questions. For each of the questions we review, we will penalize you if you disagree with
the majority of other workers who complete this HIT. The
penalty will be a deduction of 10% from the total bonus
you could have earned if your answer had agreed with the
majority.”
Promise of Future Work (ﬁnancial) “After this HIT has
been completed, we will review the performance of each
worker on the following ﬁve questions. If you perform
better than average, you will have the opportunity to work
on future jobs with us.”
Bayesian Truth Serum or BTS (ﬁnancial) “For the following ﬁve questions, we will also ask you to predict the responses of other workers who complete this task. There
is no incentive to misreport what you truly believe to be
your answers as well as others’ answers. You will have
a higher probability of winning a lottery (bonus payment)
if you submit answers that are more surprisingly common
than collectively predicted.”8
7

This text was followed by a series of questions drawn from the
General Social Survey inquiring about subjects’ agreement with
statements indicating positive attitudes towards responsibilities and
hard work. The statements, in order, were “People who don’t work
become lazy”; “Work is a duty toward society”; “Work should always come ﬁrst, even if it means less free time”; “Work is a person’s most important activity”; “I see myself as someone who does
a thorough job.”
8
The design for this treatment comes from [25] who used a near
identical method in an effort to elicit honest opinions from their
research subjects. After data collection, the responses were subsequently weighted based on the aggregate predicted distributions
of the respondents. For our own purposes, we were merely interested in the question of whether presenting our task in a similar way
would have a meaningful effect on qualitative information seeking.
The results we present do not involve any of the weighting procedures used by Prelec. We refer interested readers to the original
paper for more detailed information about this technique.

Betting on Results (ﬁnancial) “For the following ﬁve questions, you will have the opportunity to win bonuses. After
completing the questions, we will let you bet a portion of
your payment on the accuracy of your responses.”
Data Collection

The experiment ran from June 2 through September 23, 2009.
During that time, we collected a total of 2159 unique subjects, of whom 2055 completed the study and 104 dropped
out after treatment assignment. Because we used a random
treatment assignment function (instead of stratiﬁed random
assignment), the distribution of subjects across conditions
was unequal, ranging between 113 and 167 subjects per condition. Applying Pearson’s χ2 test to a contingency table
with the counts of attriters and compliers across all of the
treatment and control groups suggests that attrition was not
signiﬁcantly different from random (p = 0.919).
We also ran a regression of all the demographic covariates
against treatment condition to test whether our randomization worked. The model was not signiﬁcant and none of
the variables had a signiﬁcant association with treatment assignment. As a result, we conclude that randomization was
successful.
Following the completion of data collection, we discovered
that database storing our records from the study had stored
inaccurate values for three of the subjects. As a result, we
excluded the results from these three subjects from all subsequent analysis, with the exception of the calculation of the
total number of subjects assigned to each treatment group
used to generate our estimates of treatment effects (see below).
Statistical Analysis

In all of our estimates of treatment effects, we correct for the
increased probability of Type 1 errors when conducting multiple hypothesis tests in an experiment with many treatments
by using the single-step Bonferroni correction to adjust our
p-values [27, 17]. This correction has the advantage of simplicity as well as strong control of the Familywise Error Rate
(FWER) in a context where the comparisons being tested are
unordered [26].9
We used Intention-To-Treat (ITT) estimators to calculate the
average effect of each treatment compared against the control condition. What this means practically is that subjects
that quit after assignment to a group were still included in
calculations as answering incorrectly. ITT estimators have
the advantage of correcting for potentially confounding effects of attrition and avoiding the bias introduced into the
analysis of many randomized experimental results by regression estimates [12, 11].
RESULTS
Performance on Individual Questions

Looking at the percentage of correct responses per question across all conditions (except demographic control), subject performance varied signiﬁcantly from chance (random
9

We calculate these corrections using the “multtest” package in R.

Figure 1. Performance Distributions - All Conditions
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Table 1. Performance on Individual Questions (All Conditions)

Avatars
Content rank/rate
User rank/rate
Revenue streams
Soc. network features

Actual %
correct

Predicted % correct
(random guessing)

73.2
25.6
28.7
47.6
62.8

25
20
20
50
50

Betting
Norm prime
BTS
Trust
Humanization
Promise opport.
Solidarity
Punish agmt

χ2 test indicates all differences signiﬁcant (p ≤ 0.05)

Punish accuracy

Comparing the percentage of correct answers across questions and across experimental conditions reveals fairly consistent performance from each treatment group despite the
substantial variation across questions (see Figure 1).11

Reward agmt

Aggregate Performance (All Five Questions)

Tournament

Figure 2 illustrates aggregated worker performance across
all ﬁve questions and all experimental conditions. On average, subjects did signiﬁcantly better than chance, which
would have yielded a mean of approximately 1.58 questions
correct. The actual distribution of responses is strikingly
close to normal, with a slight concentration at 2 and a mean
of 2.38.12

Control

Reward accuracy
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Figure 2. Performance Distribution - All Conditions

Number of workers
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We used χ tests for goodness of ﬁt to calculate these comparisons
between the distribution of correct responses and predicted probabilities of producing correct answers through random guessing for
each question.
11
We did not conduct hypothesis tests comparing average treatment
effects for each question. Such question-level effects were not our
primary outcome variables in part because of the speciﬁcity of the
content of each question and the fact that we looked at responses
only from a single website. See the Discussion section below for
additional consideration of this topic.
12
This mean reﬂects only the performance of compliers - not the full
set of subjects exposed to treatment. This corrected (ITT) sample
mean was 2.26.
13
The ITT estimate of the ATE captures the mean difference in aggregated performance between the subjects in each treatment condition and the subjects in the control group. The estimates themselves are identical with the results of a linear regression on the
same data. The standard errors are different as are the underlying
p-values[12, 11]. As discussed above, all p-values have been corrected using the simple Bonferroni correction procedure [27, 17].
10
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Cheap surveillance

The results of our ITT estimation of average treatment effects (ATE) are reported in Table 2.13 To facilitate the readability of the table, we order all treatment conditions by
the absolute size of their estimated effects and only report
p ≤ 0.05.
As described above, we used the “simple” Bonferroni correction for the difference of means comparisons between
each treatment group and the control condition. The results
suggest that only two of our treatments produced a signiﬁcant improvement in worker performance over the control:

Condition

guessing among the available answer choices) for all ﬁve
questions (see Table 1).10 On four of the ﬁve, subjects performed better than chance, whereas the question about revenue streams elicited performance that was signiﬁcantly
worse than chance.

400
300
200
100
0
0

1

2

3

Correct answers

4

5

Table 3. OLS Regression on Aggregate Performance

Table 2. Average Treatment Effects (ATE) on Aggregate Performance

ATE† Std. Err.

Mean
Control
BTS
Punish-agmt.
Betting
Reward-agreement
Promise-opportunity
Tournament scoring
Solidarity
Punish-accuracy
Reward-accuracy
Humanization
Trust
Cheap talk-surveil.
Normative Priming
Cheap talk-norm.
†
‡

2.079
2.549
2.538
2.438
2.421
2.404
2.310
2.296
2.275
2.214
2.171
2.029
2.027
2.057
2.075

NA
0.471
0.459
0.359
0.342
0.326
0.232
0.217
0.197
0.136
0.092
-0.050
-0.052
-0.021
-0.003

NA
0.132
0.131
0.137
0.135
0.138
0.142
0.149
0.131
0.139
0.142
0.137
0.131
0.142
0.141

p-val.‡
NA
0.017
0.015

(Intercept)
India resident
BTS
Punishment-agreement
Betting
Promise-opportunity
Tournament scoring
Reward-agreement
Solidarity
Reward-accuracy
Punishment-accuracy
Web skill
Humanization
Cheap talk-normative
Household size
Trust
Normative Priming
Cheap talk-surveillance

ATE calculated using Intention-to-Treat (ITT) estimators.
p-values reported ≤ 0.05.

Estimate

Std. Err.

1.851
-0.739
0.596
0.482
0.437
0.398
0.358
0.310
0.291
0.232
0.230
0.147
0.136
0.131
-0.048
0.047
0.039
0.035

0.153
0.068
0.138
0.137
0.139
0.139
0.143
0.139
0.144
0.139
0.133
0.024
0.141
0.140
0.018
0.138
0.138
0.147

p-value†
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.008
0.031

0.000

Adjusted R2 = 0.127
p-values reported ≤ 0.05.

Punishment-agreement and Bayesian Truth Serum. In each
case, the effect was approximately .5 above the mean outcome in control (2.08). Both were signiﬁcant at p ≤ 0.05.

†

DISCUSSION
Post-hoc Demographic Analysis

To evaluate whether any demographic factors may have affected our estimates, we ran an ordinary least squares (OLS)
model on the dependent variable (aggregate performance, or
score out of ﬁve), incorporating the full set of demographic
control variables together with the treatment assignments.
The results of this “full” model (not reported here) suggested
that three covariates may have had a signiﬁcant association
with subject-performance despite the randomization: webuse skills14 , household size, and country of residence. To
zero-in on any potentially confounding effects of these variables, we ran a second model that included only the outcome, the treatment conditions, and these three covariates.15
The second model (reported in Table 3) suggests a signiﬁcant, negative association between performance on our outcome measure, poor web skills and residence in India (both
covariates were signiﬁcant at the p ≤ 0.001 level after correcting for multiple comparisons). Remarkably, the point estimate of the association between residence in India and the
outcome variable dwarfed any of our estimated treatment effects. Again, treatment conditions and covariates are sorted
by point estimate size to facilitate readability.
14

To measure this variable, we borrowed a survey item from an instrument designed, validated, and implemented by Eszter Hargittai
in several of her studies.[13] The item asks subjects about their
understanding of two web-browsing tools: “tabs” in an internet
browser and RSS feeds. Hargittai found that both items correlate
highly with independent measures of web-browsing and Internet
skill.
15
The fact that country of origin was signiﬁcant suggested a result consistent with previous ﬁndings about the differences between
workers from India and the US[19]. As a result, we re-coded country of residence as a binary variable, indicating whether workers

Our results suggest a signiﬁcant, positive effect of two treatment conditions - Punishment for disagreement with other
subjects, and “Bayesian Truth Serum” (BTS) - on worker
performance in a qualitative content analysis task on MTurk.
Several of the other “ﬁnancial” incentive schemes produced
large point estimates of treatment effects, but were not signiﬁcantly different from the control condition. None of the
purely “social” incentive schemes altered performance signiﬁcantly. This suggests that workers in the MTurk environment may not respond to these sorts of motivational levers.
Even though the two most effective conditions – BTS and
Punishment for disageement – are both examples of ﬁnancial
incentive schemes, the fact that they alone succeeded does
not imply a ringing endorsement of monetary incentives over
social incentives by the workers on Mturk. Rather, the challenge of these results lies in explaining why these particular
ﬁnancial incentive schemes appeared to work where so many
others did not.16
We contend that the most likely explanation of these results hinges on the fact that both the BTS and Punishmentdisagreement conditions tied worker payoffs to their ability
self-reported as residing in India or not.
One of the anonymous CSCW reviewers suggested comparing the
ﬁnancial incentives versus the social incentives in another way by
grouping the conditions into clusters and estimating treatment effects between the different clusters. While our research design supports this line of inquiry, we choose not to pursue it here for two
reasons. First, we did not conduct any preliminary testing to validate our classiﬁcation of the different treatments into one or the
other group. Second, our ﬁndings suggest that even the ﬁnancial
incentives were not purely ﬁnancial in any sense (see the rest of
this Discussion section for more on this topic).
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to prospectively reason about the performance of their peers.
However, what speciﬁc mechanisms can account for these
effects in each condition?
When compared with the other treatments and control conditions, BTS likely had two effects: (a) it created some confusion among subjects about how exactly they were being
evaluated; and (b) it created an incentive for subjects to think
carefully about the respones of other subjects. The combination of confusion and cognitive demand probably elicited
greater engagement with the question, and this engagement
in turn probably drove better performance. In the case of
BTS, we should underscore that the treatment effect is not
due to any manipulation of the responses or the predictions
provided by the subjects regarding the distribution of responses. In this regard, we did we did not follow Prelec’s
original design and use the BTS to adjust or ﬁlter subjects’
answers.[25] Instead, we simply used it as a contextual manipulation. Given that we did not provide much information
about the BTS design to the subjects performing the task,
it also seems unlikely that they would have understood the
analytical mechanisms proposed by Prelec.
The effect of the Punishment-disagreement condition raises
a distinct set of concerns insofar as it closely resembles the
Reward-agreement condition. In theory, both conditions ask
workers to perform a similar set of calculations about the
likely responses of other Mturk workers. However, the key
difference between the two stems from the role of punishment and reward in the context of relational contracts in online labor markets. In Mturk, punishment of workers by requesters is consequential in a way that rewards is not: workers can be banned from the site if their work is rejected by requesters. As a result, even though we did not claim we would
block any worker as part of the Punishment-disagreement
condition, by demonstrating our willingness to punish we
may have inadvertently suggested that there could be consequential results (like rejection) to poor performance on that
particular question. In contrast, the language of rewards
and bonus payments used in the Reward-agreement condition would not carry any of these conotations.
It is noteworthy that although the Reward-agreement condition did not have signiﬁcant effects, it did produce one of the
larger point-estimates, suggesting that prospective reasoning
by subjects about their peers may have played an attenuated
role in that group as well. However, the point estimates
for the Betting and “Promise of future opportunity” conditions were similar to that for Reward-agreement (and also
not signiﬁcantly different from the control condition). Both
of these conditions asked workers to engage in prospective
reasoning, but entail completely different mechanisms from
the agreement-based treatments.
We also ﬁnd a strong association between residence in India, web skills, and our outcome variable (information seeking task performance). This implies that culturally speciﬁc
knowledge and experience online may play an important role
mediating workers’ ability to perform the sort of qualitative

information-seeking task we asked them to do here.17
At the same time, we do not believe that these demographic
factors undermine our ﬁndings with regards to the effects
of Punishment for disagreement and Bayesian Truth Serum.
While the association between web skills, residence in India
and our outcome variable were quite strong, the point estimates for the effects of these two treatment conditions hardly
changed and remained signiﬁcant at the p ≤ 0.01 level. This
suggests that the effects we observed for the treatment conditions (at least the signiﬁcant ones) were robust and supports
our earlier claim the randomization worked as a means for
distributing these sub-populations evenly across the different
treatment groups.
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK

The connection we observed between qualitative informationseeking performance and treatment conditions asking workers to engage in prospective reasoning about their peers merits further analysis in online and ofﬂine settings. In addition, future studies conducted online and with international
subject-populations should consider the effects of potentially
confounding covariates such as country of origin and webuse skills when designing comparable studies. In our case,
the randomization proved effective, but this might not be
possible in other settings.
Our results suggest that Turkers appear to have a wide range
of abilities and that some task framings may elicit higher
quality performance than others. It is worth emphasizing
that we do not utilize any of the quality-control techniques
discussed elsewhere for ﬁltering data generated in Mturk and
similar environments[30, 19, 29, 14, 9, 5, 20]. As a result,
we do not use our ﬁndings as a basis for any general claims
about the utility (or lack thereof) of Mturk for crowdsourced
content analysis as a reliable method of data collection. Indeed, we hypothesize that incorporating additional quality
control techniques on top of the effective treatment conditions reported in this study could amplify quality improvements beyond what we report here and what other studies
have found. Subsequent research is needed to determine the
effects of interactions between the worker characteristics,
motivational framing, and other interface design manipulations.
Finally, we believe that similar studies should be conducted
among other populations online where the existing institutional structure favors other motivational criteria. The rules
and norms of the MTurk marketplace favor ﬁnancial incentives, punishment-oriented consequences and arm’s-length
relational contracting over more personalistic or sociallyoriented modes of exchange. Therefore, it would be interesting to know whether the same incentive schemes would
17

As a comparison across Mturk workers in India and the US was
not part of our original research design or hypotheses, we chose not
to compare treatment effects across the two populations in a more
purposive manner. Nevertheless, our ﬁndings here strongly suggest
that future research should conduct cross-national comparisons of
workers in online labor markets and other settings. Based on our
results, we anticipate signiﬁcant differences of motivation and performance along these lines.[2]

work among a population of Wikipedia contributors who are
accustomed to performing similar tasks without any ﬁnancial payoffs at all.
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